We estimate the e¤ects of …scal policy on the labor market in US data. An increase in government spending of 1 percent of GDP generates output and unemployment multipliers respectively of about 1.3 (at one year) and 0.6 (at the peak). Each percentage point increase in GDP produces an increase in employment of about 1.2 million jobs. Total hours, employment and the job …nding probability all rise, whereas the separation rate falls. A standard neoclassical model augmented with search and matching frictions in the labor market largely fails in reproducing the size of the output multiplier whereas it can produce a realistic unemployment multiplier but only under a special parameterization. Extending the model to strengthen the complementarity in preferences, to include unemployment bene…ts, real wage rigidity and/or distortionary taxation only worsens the picture. New Keynesian features only marginally magnify the size of the multipliers. When complementarity is coupled with price stickiness, however, the magni…cation e¤ect can be large.
Introduction
The unfolding of the …nancial crisis of 2007-08 and the vigorous response of …scal policy that followed in early 2009 has ignited a lively debate on the size (and sometimes even the sign) of …scal policy multipliers. Much of the attention in policy circles has focused on the ability of government spending increases and tax cuts to boost output and to reduce the unemployment rate. For instance, the accompanying analysis to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) (see, e.g., Romer, 2009 ) is explicit in its emphasis on the ability of the …scal stimulus to "generate jobs". 1 Despite this emphasis on labor markets in policy circles, the debate on …scal policy in the research community has focussed instead largely on the size of the GDP and consumption multiplier of government spending. This debate has been both empirical and theoretical. On the empirical side, a growing literature aims at identifying government spending shocks that can be used to estimate these multipliers: 2 empirical estimates. 3 Much less attention has been devoted to the qualitative and the quantitative implications of …scal policy for the unemployment rate and the labor market in general.
Our goal in this paper is twofold. First, to provide an empirical estimate of both the output and the unemployment multipliers of government spending in US data, focusing in more detail on the transmission of …scal policy to the labor market. 4 Thus, we investigate the e¤ects on variables such as labor market tightness (the ratio of vacancies to unemployment), the job …nding probability, the separation rate, the extensive and intensive margins of work (respectively, employment and hours 3 See Hall (2009) and Ramey (2009) for a useful survey of the issues involved. 4 As in much of the recent literature, in this paper we focus exclusively on the e¤ects of unproductive government spending on goods and services, …nanced by lump-sum taxation. This is not because this type of …scal policy is more important than other types of spending, such as government investment and transfers, or more important than taxation. Rather, the reason is that the e¤ects of this type of spending are clearly di¤erentiated in di¤erent models. Of course, we realize that in the data we do not have "pure" experiments of this type of …scal policy.
per worker), labor force participation, and the real wage.
The second goal is to provide a theoretical framework that we can use to begin interpreting these results. To this end, we start by incorporating search and matching frictions à la Mortensen and Pissarides (1995) in a dynamic general equilibrium model, along the lines of a recent literature pioneered by Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) . 5 While this literature has focused almost exclusively on the ability of search and matching models to replicate the observed volatility of (un)employment conditional on technology shocks, we study the response to government spending shocks.
We realize however that the empirical estimates we provide above are controversial, for reasons that we discuss brie ‡y in section 2. For those who regard these estimates with skepticism, the theoretical part of this paper can still be useful as a …rst-step investigation of the e¤ects of …scal policy on the labor markets. In fact, to develop the theoretical framework we proceed incrementally, starting from an extension to an environment with labor search frictions of the classic …scal policy analysis of Baxter and King (1993) , which is framed within the neoclassical growth model with frictionless labor markets. Such framework therefore is not suitable for an assessment of the e¤ects of a …scal stimulus on the unemployment rate. 6 We then study how New-Keynesian features such as imperfect competition and time-varying markups (resulting from nominal price rigidity) can interact with labor search frictions in a¤ecting percent. The responses of both variables, however, are not very precisely estimated.
On the theoretical side, we …rst characterize how the transmission of …scal policy di¤ers in an environment with labor search frictions as opposed to one with frictionless labor markets. The key insight is that with search frictions the …rm's employment decision becomes forward-looking. Hence it is a¤ected by channels, such as the variation in the present value of the match between the worker and the …rm, which are absent in the baseline RBC model. In this context, persistent shocks to government spending can have in principle a signi…cant e¤ect on the current rate of unemployment.
We then show how di¤erent features of the baseline model in ‡uence the unemployment and output multipliers of government spending. We start by showing that a baseline real model with search and matching frictions has fundamental di¢ culties in matching the estimated sizes of the unemployment and output multipliers. A value of the former that matches the estimated multiplier can be obtained only if a key parameter, the average relative value of non-work to work activities, is calibrated to be in the high range of available estimates. In our model, such parameter governs the elasticity of the hiring rate to changes in the marginal utility of wealth. Interestingly this parameter a¤ects also the elasticity of the hiring rate to variations in the marginal product of labor, and is therefore of critical importance also for the quantitative e¤ects of technology shocks on the unemployment rate (see Shimer, 2009 , and Hagedorn and Manowski, 2008). However, even when the value of this parameter is calibrated to be in the high range, so as to roughly match the size of the unemployment multiplier of government spending estimated in the data, the model clearly delivers an output multiplier well below the estimated one. The key to this result is a highly negative consumption multiplier typical of these models, which is in stark contrast with our empirical estimates.
A recent literature shows that wage rigidity magni…es the e¤ects of technology shocks on the unemployment rate (Hall, 2005 , Shimer, 2005 , Gertler and Trigari, 2008 . We show that in our model real wage rigidity actually decreases the unemployment multiplier of government spending.
Similarly, a higher degree of complementarity between consumption and employment (an inverse measure of the intensity of the wealth e¤ect stemming from variations in the present value of taxes) tends to dampen the the unemployment multiplier. Other modelling features that strengthen the realism of the model, such as the presence of unemployment bene…ts and/or debt …nancing with distortionary taxation, all contribute to reducing the unemployment and output multipliers of our baseline model.
We then introduce imperfect competition and nominal price rigidity. These features introduce a new channel of …scal policy: countercyclical variations in the present value of markups, which tend to boost the hiring rate. Within this context we obtain three main results. First, a search and matching model augmented with NK features can magnify both the output and unemployment multipliers, but still delivers a size of the output multiplier largely below 1. Once again, this is due to a strongly negative consumption multiplier. Second, unlike the baseline case with ‡exible prices and perfectly competitive goods markets, the degree of complementarity between consumption and employment now helps. In other words, with price stickiness, a su¢ ciently high degree of complementarity can generate a crowding-in of private consumption, and signi…cantly boost the output multiplier. On the other hand, in the NK context, real wage rigidity has only a minor e¤ect on the size of the multipliers.
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) (BEF henceforth) is an earlier attempt to investigate, both empirically and theoretically, the implications of changes in government spending for the labor market. That study di¤ers from ours in two dimensions. First, the empirical methodology: while BEF employ a dummy-based narrative approach to identify exogenous innovations to government spending (and defense spending in particular), we adopt a structural VAR approach based on recursive ordering. Second, BEF analyze their results through the lens of a real business cycle model with perfect labor markets, whereas labor search frictions are at the heart of our model.
Other recent investigations of the e¤ects of …scal policy on labor markets are Ramey (2009), which we discuss extensively below, and Nekarda and Ramey (2009), who study the response of markups to government spending shocks using input-output tables. 7 The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the results from the empirical analysis and provides a more general discussion on the methodologies that have been used in the literature to estimate the e¤ects of …scal policy. Section 3 presents the baseline model with search and matching frictions and government spending. Section 4 provides the main intuition for the channels through which government spending a¤ect hiring and (un)employment. Section 5 presents the dynamic e¤ects of government spending shocks within a calibrated version of the model. Section 6 extends the baseline model along a number of dimensions to assess the robustness of the quantitative results and to highlight additional mechanisms. Section 7 introduces the most relevant deviation from the baseline model by adding monopolistic competition and price stickiness, thus introducing an additional channel through which government spending a¤ects hiring. Finally, section 8 concludes. 7 See Perotti (2007) for an earlier application of this methodology to the same issue.
4
To investigate the e¤ects of …scal policy on labor market variables we estimate a VAR. 8 We identify government spending shocks on the basis of the approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002):
assuming that there are decision lags of at least three months, government spending cannot react to output and other shocks within a given quarter, hence in quarterly data government spending is predetermined. We then identify government spending shocks via a Choleski decomposition with government spending as the …rst variable.
Our benchmark speci…cation includes the following variables: the log of real per-capita government consumption (i.e., current government spending on goods and services), the log of real per-capita GDP, the log of real per-capita private consumption of non-durables and services, the nominal interest rate on 3-month T-bills, and the average marginal income tax rate from Barro and Redlick (2009); to this …xed set of variables we add one or two labor market variables in turn. In the …rst speci…cation the labor market variables are the logs of total civilian employment and total civilian hours, both divided by the civilian non-institutional population ages 16 to 64. 10 Figure   1 illustrates the main results. The responses of government spending and private consumption are expressed as percentage points of GDP; the initial shock to government spending is normalized to 1 percentage point of GDP. The …gure displays the point estimate of the response, the median response out of 1000 replications, and two-standard error bands, corresponding to the 25th and 8 We choose to abstract from the analysis of the e¤ects of government investment and/or taxation. These are for instance an important component of the recent ARRA program in the US. Our goal is however not to provide a quantitative assessment of the impact of that program. 9 See Ramey and Shapiro (1998). Ramey (2009) argues that, because …scal policy is often anticipated, the Ramey -Shapiro dummy dates help predict VAR shocks; by construction, our shocks are orthogonal to the Ramey -Shapiro dummies up to 4 lags. Rossi and Zubairy (2009) also include these war dummies, but do not show impulse responses based on this speci…cation.
1 0 These data were assembled by Valerie Ramey based on published and unpublished data from the BLS, and kindly made available to us by the author. Results with total (including military) employment and hours are nearly identical. GDP and private consumption both rise, with peak responses at about 1.5 and .7 percentage points of GDP, respectively, after about two and a half years; at peak, both responses are signi…cant at the 95 percent con…dence level. Employment and hours also rise signi…cantly, with peak responses of about 1.5 percent, again after about 10 quarters. As a result, the average number of hours per employed individual does not change signi…cantly.
In the next speci…cation we add the log of total unemployment and the log of the civilian labor force (both divided by population) to the …xed set of variables; the …rst three panels of Figure   2 (on the …rst row) display their responses, as well as the implied response of the unemployment rate. 12 Unemployment falls, with a peak of about 10 percentage points again after 10 quarters, 1 1 The standard errors were computed using the MONTEVAR routine in RATS. Much of the existing literature on …scal policy VARs has used one-standard error bands (a notable recent exception is Ramey 2009); it is quite possible that this tradition was initiated by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) . Be as it may, we believe this was a mistake, and that there is no reason to use non-standard standard error bands. Thus, in this paper we display only two-standard error bands. 1 2 The response of the unemployment rate is constructed as the response of the log of total unemployment less the response of the log of the labor force, multipied by the average unemployment rate over the sample. In the next speci…cation, we add both the logs of vacancies and of total unemployment, both as shares of the population under 16, and calculate tightness as the di¤erences of these two responses.
Vacancies (…rst panel of the second row) increase substantially, by about 12 percent at peak (the standard deviation of the log change of vacancies is 34 percent). Combined with a decrease in unemployment which is only slightly smaller, this delivers an increase in labor market tightness by almost 20 percent, with a peak slightly later than 10 quarters. The response of tightness is marginally insigni…cant at the 95 percent con…dence level.
The next panels display the responses of the job …nding probability and of the separation rate, each added in turn to the …xed set of variables. Both variables are calculated from data on unemployment and short-term unemployment as in Shimer (2005) . The job …nding probability increases, by about 3 percent at peak; the separation rate falls by about .12 percent at peak. 13 Both responses are just about insigni…cant at peak.
The last two panels display the responses of the real product wage and of the markup in manufacturing. The former increases by about 2.5 percent after about two years, and returns to trend very slowly. The latter falls by about 1 percent, but it is not estimated precisely. Table 1 displays a few multipliers for GDP and unemployment. The …rst two columns display the actual responses, or the multipliers relative to the initial government spending shock, which is normalized to 1 percentage point of GDP. The next two columns display the cumulative multipliers.
The cumulative GDP multiplier at horizon X is computed as the cumulative percentage change in GDP after X quarters, divided by the cumulative change in the government spending, expressed in percentage points of GDP, at the same horizon. The unemployment multiplier is computed as the cumulative response of the unemployment rate after X quarters divided by the same denominator.
After the second quarter, the GDP responses and the GDP multipliers are very similar: both are well above 1, and on the high side relative to those estimated in the literature. The unemployment rate responses and multipliers are also similar, reaching between -.5 and -.6 at year 2. 
Discussion
The identi…cation of government spending shocks has been the subject of a lively debate in recent years. 14 This debate has implications that go well beyond the econometrics, because di¤erent identi…cation schemes can lead to very di¤erent conclusions about the responses of key variables to …scal shocks. To summarize why this is important, note that while virtually all models imply that a surprise increase in government spending has positive e¤ects on GDP (if taxes are not too distortionary), in neoclassical models typically private consumption and the real wage decline, while This approach is potentially fruitful, as one can argue quite plausibly that the changes in defense spending identi…ed with this method were exogenous. However, we like many others, are skeptical that one can learn much about the e¤ects of …scal policy on consumption during a period, like WWII, when non-durables were rationed and the production of many durables for civilian We realize, of course, that all identi…cation schemes are questionable. We see the empirical evidence we have presented as mostly a motivation for the theoretical analysis below. For those who are unconvinced by our identi…cation scheme, we think the best way to interpret the rest of this paper is to see it as a study of the building blocks of the e¤ects of …scal policy in a model with search and matching frictions, with increasing levels of complications.
The model
In this section we illustrate the baseline version of our model, a conventional search and matching model to which we add a …scal sector. To start with, we abstract from frictions in the adjustment of prices.
Unemployment, vacancies and matching
There is a continuum of in…nitely-lived workers and a continuum of in…nitely-lived identical …rms, each of measure one. Each …rm employs n t workers in the current period: To attract new workers for the current period of operation it posts v t vacancies. Posting vacancies is costly: we assume that hiring costs are linear in the number of vacancies. The total number of unemployed workers 1 7 However, inferences from these estimates are made di¢ cult by other issues discussed in Perotti (2009).
searching for a job is 18
Following convention, we assume that the aggregate number of new hires or "matches", m t , is a Cobb-Douglas function of unemployed workers and vacancies, as follows:
where the parameter m re ‡ects the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The current probability that a …rm …lls a vacancy, q t , is given by
where t v t =u t is labor market tightness, the ratio of vacancies, v t , to searching unemployed workers, u t . Similarly, the probability an unemployed worker …nds a job, p t , is given by
Both …rms and workers take q t and p t as given. Finally, each …rm exogenously separates from a fraction 1 of existing workers each period, where is the probability a worker "survives" with the …rm until the next period.
Firms
Every period, the representative …rm produces output, y t ; using capital, k t ; and labor, n t ; according to the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
where z is a common productivity factor. Capital is perfectly mobile across …rms and there is a competitive rental market in capital.
Firms increase their current workforce n t by posting vacancies v t . The timing is as follows:
each …rm starts period t with n t 1 employed workers; at the beginning of the period, …rms post v t vacancies to attract new workers and u t = 1 n t 1 workers search for jobs; the searching process leads to m t new matches; then, a fraction 1 of workers employed at t 1 is exogenously separated from each …rm; separated workers cannot search until the following period; …nally, newly formed matches, m t , become productive within the same period and are not subject to separations until the following period. Total period-t workforce is then the sum of the number of last period's surviving workers, n t 1 , and new hires, q t v t :
Let t;t+1 be the …rm's stochastic discount factor between period t and t + 1, where is the household's subjective discount factor and t;t+1 is de…ned below. 19 Let w t be the real wage rate, r k;t the rental rate on capital and the per period cost of keeping a vacancy open. The …rm's problem can be then written:
subject to (6).
The …rst order condition for the choice of capital is
equating the marginal product of capital to the rental rate.
Firms choose n t by setting v t . Taking the …rst order condition with respect to n t one can write
where a t (1 ) y t =n t is the marginal product of labor.
By making use of the envelope condition to obtain @F (n t 1 ; k t ) =@n t 1 and combining equations we obtain
Condition (9) equates the marginal cost of hiring a worker with the marginal bene…t. The latter is
given by a discounted stream of …rm's expected future net earnings from the marginal worker.
For the purpose of the wage bargain it is useful to de…ne F n;t as the value to the …rm of having an additional worker at time t after new workers have joined the …rm, i.e., after vacancy posting costs are sunk. Di¤erentiating F (n t 1; k t ) with respect to n t taking v t as given, using also (8) to rearrange, one obtains
so that F n;t may be expressed as the discounted stream of expected future pro…ts per worker as follows:
Finally, using (3) it is useful to rewrite (9) in terms of market tightness t as follows:
The above equation states that, because of hiring costs, market tightness depends on the current and (discounted) future marginal product of labor net of the real wage. Notice that for ! 0 the previous expression reduces to the standard condition equating the current real wage to the current marginal product of labor. The same occurs if the e¢ ciency of the matching process improves, i.e., m ! 1. In both cases the model with search and matching frictions converges to the frictionless economy without matching frictions.
Households
We use the "family" construct of Merz (1995) . In particular, there is a representative household consisting of a continuum of individuals of mass one. The household pools incomes and allocates total consumption across members to maximize the sum of utilities. As in Shimer (2009) , assume that the period-t utility function of a household member is c The household has a diversi…ed ownership stake in …rms which pays out pro…ts t , and pays lump sum taxes to the government t . The household may either consume (on average) c t or accumulate capital k t through investment i t according to
where is the depreciation rate of capital, and t is a function that captures adjustment costs on capital proportional to the rate of change in investment (as in Christiano et al., 2005):
with ( ) satisfying = 0 = 0 and 00 (1) > 0 in the steady state.
Thus, the representative household faces a single period-by-period budget constraint of the form:
where B denotes the holding of real one period state contingent securities. Further, the household recognizes that household employment is determined by the ‡ows of its members into and out of employment according to
where the household takes p t as given.
By taking …rst order conditions with respect to c e;t and c u;t one can show (see Shimer 2009) that, in equilibrium, the household behaves as if it has intertemporal utility
where is the discount factor, subject to the same budget constraint as before
where c t = c e;t n t + c u;t (1 n t ) is average consumption of employed and unemployed workers. 20 Let H t be the representative household lifetime utility. Then the household maximization problem may be expressed as
subject to (18) and (16).
The …rst order necessary condition for consumption yields:
where t is the marginal utility of wealth (i.e., the multiplier on the household's budget constraint).
Equation (20) links the marginal utility of wealth to the marginal utility of consumption. The …rst order conditions for investment and capital read:
where ' t is the shadow value of a unit of investment (the multiplier on (13)), i;t is the derivative of ( ) with respect to its argument, and t;t+1 = t+1 = t .
Using the envelope condition for employment, we derive the marginal value to the household of having one member employed rather than unemployed, H n;t , which is a determinant of the bargaining problem:
where U n;t is the marginal disutility from work, given by
Non-separability in utility makes U n;t time-varying: with = 1, we have U n;t = b.
Equation (23) indicates that the household's shadow value of one additional employed member (the left hand side) has three components: …rst, the increase in utility generated by having an additional member employed, given by the real wage expressed in utils; second, the decrease in utility from lower leisure, given by the marginal disutility of work; third, the continuation utility value, given by the contribution of a current match to next period household's employment.
Marginal value of non-work activity
Note that we can write U n;t as
so that
where
! t is the current marginal value of non-work activity. Importantly, this value does not only capture the marginal value of leisure, but broadly the value of all non-market activities, including home production and unemployment bene…ts.
Notice that the elasticity of ! t to the marginal utility of wealth is decreasing in :
In our context the e¤ect of the marginal utility of wealth on the value of non-work activity will bear important implications for the transmission of …scal policy.
Nash bargaining and reservation wages
Each period, the …rm negotiates with the marginal worker over the surplus from the marginal match. We assume Nash bargaining so that the wage w t is chosen to maximize (H n;t ) (F n;t )
where 2 (0; 1] re ‡ects the workers'bargaining power.
The …rst order necessary condition for Nash bargaining is
where H n;t = t is the marginal bene…t to the household of one additional employed worker, expressed in units of consumption goods.
The size of the surplus, S n;t , is determined by the size of the bargaining set, i.e., the gap between the reservation wages: the minimum wage acceptable to the worker, w t , and the maximum wage acceptable to the …rm, w t . More speci…cally, we have
with w t = a t + E t f t;t+1 F n;t+1 g : (30)
Intuitively, if the marginal value ! t is higher, non-work activities become more attractive at the margin, and the household's minimum acceptable wage will rise. The household's reservation wage is then decreasing in the continuation value, for the household is willing to trade o¤ a lower wage for a higher future continuation value from the match. Conversely, the …rm will be willing to increase its maximum acceptable wage both if the current marginal product of labor is higher and its future expected continuation value is higher.
Nash bargaining implies that the worker and the …rm receive a share of the surplus that is constant over time and equal to the relative bargaining power. The surplus that a job match creates is shared according to the parameter . To see why, let S n;t = H n;t = t + F n;t denote the total surplus from a marginal match expressed in units of the consumption good. Then, using (28), it is easy to see that H n;t = t = S n;t and F n;t = (1 ) S n;t .
The bargained wage in turn is a weighted average of the bargaining set limits, with weight equal to the bargaining power:
where the higher is the worker's bargaining power the closer is the wage to the …rm's reservation wage and vice versa Substituting the expressions for F n;t and H n;t (equations (11) and (23)) in the sharing rule, and using also the hiring condition (10), it is straightforward to show that the wage that solves the bargaining problem is given by
Equation (33) states that the bargained wage is a weighted average of two terms: …rst, the worker is rewarded for a fraction of the marginal contribution to the match (the marginal product of labor augmented with the contribution to the saving in hiring costs, here expressed as proportional to future labor market tightness); second, the worker is compensated for a fraction 1 of the marginal value of non-working activity (or, equivalently, the marginal cost of work activity).
Surplus
Combining equations (11) and (23) with the Nash rule (28), we can write a recursive expression for the total surplus as follows:
The surplus derived from the match depends on two terms: …rst, the current gap between the marginal product of labor and the marginal value of non-work activities; second, the continuation value of the match, conditional on the same match surviving next period.
Next, using (10) and the fact that bargaining implies F n;t = (1 ) S n;t , one can express the hiring condition as
Equation (35) shows that that the …rm's hiring rate depends directly on the size of the surplus derived from the match.
Government policy and resource constraint
Lump sum taxes adjust to balance the government budget constraint:
where government spending, g t , follows the exogenous stochastic process:
with " g;t i.i.d. and where g y = g=y denotes the steady state share of government spending in output.
By combining (36) with (18), and recalling that in equilibrium B t = 0 for all t, we obtain the aggregate resource constraint:
Model properties
In this section we analyze the the dynamic properties of the model. 21 
Dynamics
In order to better inspect the mechanism driving the short-run e¤ect of variations in government purchases on the labor market, we take a log-linear approximation of (34) and write
o where ( p) > 0, and a hat denotes the percentage deviation of a variable from its steady state value (denoted without superscript). In the above expression, b r t E t n b t;t+1 o is the real interest rate, and ! is the steady-state relative value of non-work to work activity, given by
Notice that ! is increasing in b, the relative disutility of work, and decreasing in , the marginal utility of wealth. We will show below that the value of the parameter ! is critical in determining the size of the government spending multipliers, both for ouput and unemployment. Equation (39) reveals that variations in government spending a¤ect the surplus and, in turn, the hiring rate via three channels: (i) a marginal value of work channel, (ii) a real interest rate channel, and (iii) a capital accumulation channel.
The intuition works as follows. Consider a temporary rise in the present value of government spending, and therefore of taxes. This induces a tightening of the household's budget constraint, captured by a rise in t , and lowers the value of non-working activity b ! t , which raises the surplus S n;t . In turn, this raises F n;t and the hiring rate t .
There are two key parameters that determine the size of this e¤ect. This can be seen by extrapolating the term
b t from expression (39). In particular we can write:
Hence a rise in the shadow value of wealth lowers the marginal value of non-work activities b ! t with elasticity 1= . In turn, a variation in b ! t a¤ects the surplus via an elasticity that depends on !.
The channel a¤ecting the marginal value of work competes, however, with two additional, and counter-acting, channels. For one, since the shock is temporary, the rise in the shadow value of wealth pushes the equilibrium real interest rate up. In turn, this produces a fall in the discounted marginal bene…t from new vacancies (for given wages and given marginal product of labor): this e¤ect discourages hiring. The presence of capital accumulation adds an additional e¤ect. A lower expected future capital stock (due to the fall in current investment) implies a lower marginal product of labor, thereby further discouraging hiring.
By log-linearizing equations (12) and (33) one can then easily derive a log-linearized expression for the hiring rate as:
Equation (40) 
The role of the relative value of non-work activities
As suggested above the e¤ect of variations in government spending on market tightness is larger the higher is !, the average value of non-work relative to work activities. When the (steadystate) marginal value of work activities, a, is close to the (steady-state) marginal value of non-work activities, b 1= , the average joint surplus from the marginal match is small. Since …rms obtain a constant share 1 of the joint surplus, the average pro…t from hiring an additional worker is also small. In this case, changes in either the marginal product of labor or in the marginal value of time will have a high leverage on the pro…t from the marginal match. Even small changes in the marginal value of time, induced by small changes in government spending through small changes in the marginal utility of wealth, will cause a very large change in …rms'pro…ts in percentage terms, and thus induce very large changes in …rms'hiring activity.
The role of the average relative value of non-work to work activity, !, has been emphasized in the literature initiated by Shimer (2005) focusing on the ability of the search and matching model to generate a large response of hiring activity to productivity shocks. Not surprisingly, a high value of ! is key for the result in Hagedorn and Manowskii (2008) who argue that a standard Mortensen and Pissarides type of model (driven only by productivity shocks) can replicate the volatility in (un)employment observed in the data absent wage rigidity.
To summarize, a large steady-state value of non-work relative to work activity reduces the average surplus and thus makes it easier to generate large labor market ‡uctuations to any shock a¤ecting the surplus. In other words, employment is highly elastic to driving forces. This is also equivalent to assuming that employment is strongly wage elastic: even a small variation in the real wage can generate large ‡uctuations in equilibrium (un)employment. One can think of ! as a key determinant of the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin, playing a similar role to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply at the intensive margin. However, while the latter is a preferencebased parameter, which household data indicate to be small (see Hall, 2009 , for a survey), the former connects employment and the wage in equilibrium and depends on a number of parameters in a convoluted way.
Dynamic simulations
In this section we simulate a quantitative version of the model. Our goal is to quantify the size of the unemployment and output multiplier in the baseline version of the model when all the channels of variations in government spending are at work: the marginal value of time channel, the real interest rate channel and the capital accumulation channel. To this end a thorough discussion of our calibration strategy is crucial.
Calibration
The job …nding rate in the US is typically quite high, so unemployed workers on average …nd a job within a quarter. To properly capture this feature of the data, we choose to calibrate the model at a monthly frequency.
There are twelve parameters to which we need to assign values. Three are conventional in the business cycle literature: the discount factor, , the depreciation rate, ; and the share parameter on capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function, . We use conventional values for all these parameters: = 0:99 1=3 , = 0:025=3, = 1=3. We assume that the investment adjustment cost function is convex and given by ( ) ( k =2) (i t =i t 1 1) 2 , and choose k = 3:24 following the estimates of Christiano et al. (2005) . Note that in contrast to the frictionless labor market model, the term 1 does not necessarily correspond to the labor share, since the latter will in general depend on the outcome of the bargaining process. However, because a wide range of values of the bargaining power imply a labor share just below 1 ; here we simply follow convention by setting 1 = 2=3. 22 We set the value for the government spending autoregressive parameter, g = 0:9, in line with our VAR estimates.
There are …ve parameters that are speci…c to the search and matching framework: the job survival rate, , the e¢ ciency parameter in matching, m , the elasticity of matches to unemployment, , the bargaining power parameter, , and the hiring cost parameter, ; and two parameters that describe preferences: the parameter governing the degree of complementarity in consumption and labor, , and the parameter capturing distaste for work, b.
We choose the average monthly separation rate 1 following Shimer's (2005) calculations, according to which jobs last about two years and a half. Therefore, we set = 1 0:035. We symmetry in bargaining and set to be equal to 0:5. This choice also guarantees that the Hosios (1990) condition for e¢ ciency is satis…ed. We then set the i) the adjustment cost parameter, , ii) the disutility of work parameter, b, and iii) the e¢ ciency parameter in matching, m , to target i) the average job …nding probability, p, ii) the ratio of the marginal value of time to the marginal product of labor, !, and iii) the average value of market tightness, . We choose p = 0:45 to match recent estimates of the U.S. average monthly job …nding rate (Shimer, 2005) . We set = 0:5, close
to the values that can be obtained from measures of vacancies in JOLTS. Note however that the choice of implies a normalization. 23 Perhaps most controversial is the choice of !. In the baseline calibration we set ! = 0:9 as an upperbound limit, but we provide a discussion at the end of the section. We calibrate the complementarity parameter to 1, which corresponds to the separable utility case, but we explore the role of non separability further below.
Our baseline parameterization is summarized in Table 2 . which equates the …rm expected cost of hiring a worker to the …rm's share of the surplus from the match. For given choices of , , and p, when the marginal value of time is closer to the value of work, i.e., when ! = b 1= =a is larger, the surplus from the match is smaller and so is the share accruing to the …rm. This implies that in equilibrium the cost of hiring a worker or, equivalently, the size of search frictions must also be smaller. 24 There has not been much consensus in the recent literature on how to calibrate the value of non work to work activities or, alternatively, other measures of the size of search frictions. Shimer Note that, for given values of , , , , and p, targeting the cost of hiring a worker in terms of wages, ( =q)=w, or the share of total hiring costs to output, v=y, is equivalent to targeting !, as implied by the following steady state relations:
Using these relations and with the purpose of making comparison across papers, Table 3 This …nding is remarkable because it is obtained in the context of a model in which the implicit employment elasticity is high (as implied by the calibration of ! = 0:9). The main reason for the small size of the output multiplier relies in the behavior of consumption and investment, which both fall in response to the increase in government spending. Conversely, the unemployment multiplier can get su¢ ciently close to our SVAR estimates if the value of ! is su¢ ciently high.
Baseline results
The main implication of this section is that if we accept that a reasonable value for ! should be in the high range (close to 0:9) then a neoclassical model augmented with search and matching frictions can generate unemployment multipliers that match our estimates fairly closely, whereas the output multipliers remain largely below our estimates.
Extensions
In this section we illustrate a series of modi…cations that have important implications for the size of the unemployment and output multipliers. Understanding how they work is important in order to highlight the channels of operation of …scal policy in this model.
Non-separability
A recent literature has advocated non-separable preferences as a desirable feature of business cycle models of the labor market. Shimer (2009) The solid line corresponds to the baseline case of separable utility ( = 1) analyzed earlier.
In the top panel we set ! = 0:4, whereas in the bottom panel we set ! = 0:9. Clearly, complementarity between consumption and employment dampens the size of both multipliers. The intuition for this result is that higher complementarity makes the marginal value of non-work activity less sensitive to the marginal utility of wealth. In fact, the (absolute) value of the elasticity of ! t to t is 1= , which is decreasing in . Hence, for any given increase in the marginal utility of wealth (due to higher taxes), the higher is the smaller the fall in the marginal value of nonwork activity, and hence the smaller the e¤ect on the total surplus. In turn, this a¤ect negatively equilibrium hiring.
This result is somehow the analog, within a search and matching model, of a a similar result obtained in Monacelli and Perotti (2008) , who show, within a neoclassical model with non-separable preferences, that the intensity of the wealth e¤ect on labor supply is negatively related to the degree of complementarity between consumption and hours.
Unemployment bene…ts
So far we have assumed that the ‡ow bene…t from being unemployed only comes in the form of leisure gains. However, more generally, the ‡ow value of unemployment can either include unemployment insurance collected from the government or a bene…t from producing at home or in an informal market activity. These components are typically modelled in the literature as a …xed monetary bene…t per unemployed worker. Since in our model the key channel through which increases in government spending stimulate hiring activity is via changes in the value of time, how we interpret the ‡ow value of unemployment has important implications.
In this section we interpret the ‡ow unemployment bene…t not only as leisure value but also as unemployment insurance, which implies interpreting the bene…t also as home production. The introduction of unemployment bene…ts in the model modi…es the household's budget constraint to include an additional term, as follows:
where b u is the value of unemployment bene…ts per unemployed worker.
The marginal value of an employed household's member becomes
while the wage equation becomes
where in both expressions the value of non-work activity expressed in consumption units is now the sum of two components: the marginal rate of substitution, b 1= t , and the unemployment insurance, b u . With the purpose of understanding the e¤ects of government spending shocks, the key aspect here is that only the …rst component is a¤ected by variations in the marginal utility of wealth.
This implies that in the extreme case where we interpreted the ‡ow value of unemployment bene…t as only unemployment insurance (or home production), the channel working via the marginal value of non-work activities would be absent. A rise in government spending would then unambiguously lead to a decrease in hiring, employment and output, as a consequence of the real interest rate and capital accumulation channels.
To explore the quantitative e¤ects of allowing for unemployment insurance in the model, we …rst note that the expression for the average relative value of non-work to work activity is now given by
We then modify the calibration as follows. We keep ! b = 0:9 and we choose b u so that the average replacement ratio, b u =w, is 0:4, similarly to Shimer (2005) . In fact, since the average marginal product a is close to the average wage w, this implies that b u =a is close to b u =w. It also implies that ( b= 1= )=a is close to 0:5. to the case where we also allow for unemployment insurance. As expected, the implied multipliers are lower in the case with unemployment insurance.
Wage rigidity
While the Nash rule is a natural way to split the surplus in search models, any wage within the bargaining set could in theory be an equilibrium outcome of the negotiation. This key observation has led a number of researchers, starting with Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) , to investigate the role of rigid wages in search models.
As long as the (rigid) wage remains in the bargaining set, wage rigidity has no e¤ect on the decision to form or continue a match once a worker and a …rm have met. However, wage rigidity a¤ects the rate at which …rms post vacancies to attract new workers since it in ‡uences …rms' expected gains from hiring a worker. Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) show that wage rigidity signi…cantly ampli…es the cyclical response of hiring activity to productivity shocks. A positive productivity shock generally a¤ects the bargaining set in two ways: it tends to increase its size (as the match surplus increases) and tends to shift it toward higher wages (as both reservation wages, w t and w t , generally increase). The rigid wage, then, moves toward the lower (upper) limit of the bargaining set in expansions (recessions), so that hiring incentives are high (low). Wage rigidity ampli…es the employment response to productivity shocks by making the …rm share of the surplus procyclical, so that hiring is encouraged in booms and discouraged in recessions.
The e¤ect of wage rigidity on hiring incentives in response to government spending shocks is in general, however, of the opposite sign. Consider a positive government spending shock that raises hiring and employment (that is, one for which the net e¤ect of the three channels analyzed above is expansionary), as it is the case under our baseline calibration. The shock increases the size of the bargaining set (as it raises the surplus). As we have seen above, while the …rm's reservation wage w t rises in response to the shock, the worker's reservation wage w t falls. Under our baseline calibration, the reduction in the workers's reservation wage is large enough relative to the increase in the …rm's reservation wage so that the ‡exible Nash bargained wage falls. In equilibrium, both the …rm's and the worker's shares of the surplus remain constant in equilibrium.
Suppose now, for the sake of illustration, that the real wage is strictly …xed. In this case the …rm's share of the surplus will decrease in response to positive government shocks, thereby discouraging hiring. Hence, in general, wage rigidity will dampen the e¤ect of government spending shocks on hiring.
To make the argument more concrete, we extend the model to incorporate real wage rigidity.
We do this through a simple wage adjustment rule as in Shimer (2009) . 25 We distinguish between a target wage, w nb t , which is determined by the Nash bargaining solution, and the actual wage, w t , which is a weighted average of the target wage and last period actual wage. The rule is given by
where is a partial adjustment parameter that re ‡ects the degree of wage rigidity. When = 0, the actual wage corresponds to the Nash bargained wage and we recover the baseline case. of the surplus decreases (increases) in the aftermath of the shock, with the e¤ect on the …rm and worker shares being larger the higher is the degree of wage rigidity. We see that, as anticipated from our intuition above, a higher degree of real wage rigidity dampens the size of both the output and the unemployment multipliers.
Debt …nancing and distortionary taxes
Thus far we have assumed that government spending is …nanced via lump-sum taxes levied on the household, and that the government budget constraint is balanced in every period. In this section we wish to explore the implications of distortionary taxation and debt …nancing. c t + i t + E t f t;t+1 B t+1 g + B g;t+1 w t n t (1 n t ) + r k;t k t + (1 + r t )B g;t + t t ;
where n t is the tax rate on labor income 26 and B g;t is one-period real government debt purchased in t-1 and paying o¤ a net return of r t .
The government budget constraint now reads: B g;t+1 + n;t w t n t + t = g t + (1 + r t )B g;t
The government adjust each …scal instruments according to the following feedback rules
where f t = n;t , g t , t respectively.
The …rst order condition from the wage bargaining process now implies:
The presence of distortionary taxation modi…es only the wage determination equation. It is easy to show that the wage implied by the wage bargaining process now becomes
is a composite term that depends on the current and the expected future distortionary tax rates.
Note that in the absence of distortionary taxation ( n t = 0 for all t), equation (47) coincides with (33).
Distortionary taxation produces two e¤ects on the bargained wage. For one, a rise in the 2 6 We abstract here from capital income and consumption taxes. current labor income tax rate tends to increase the tax-adjusted marginal value of non-work activity, ! t =(1 n t ), leading workers to bargain for higher wages. This e¤ect lowers the surplus from the match, and therefore discourages hiring. But in our context there is an additional (dynamic) e¤ect captured by the term T t+1 . This e¤ect reinforces the upward pressure on wages. Notice that if distortionary tax rates were constant over time ( n t = n for all t) we would have T t = 1 for all t, so that distortionary taxation would only a¤ect wages via changing the relative value of non-work to work activity. re-sell them to the households. 27 Retailers adjust prices according to a conventional Calvo (1983) speci…cation where 1 denotes each period …xed probability of re-setting the price. 28 We close the model by postulating a simple interest rate feed-back rule according to which the monetary authority adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate, r n t , in response to …nal consumption goods in ‡ation, t , and output growth: where t is the price markup. Hence movements in the markup a¤ect both the hiring and the wage equation via the marginal product of labor.
In this context, the analog of the expression for the surplus is S n;t = a ;t ! t + E t f( p t+1 ) t;t+1 S n;t+1 g while the steady state relative value of non-work to work activity in terms of …nal goods reads
Two main implications follow. First, even under ‡exible prices, the presence of market power per se ( > 1) increases the average marginal value of non-work relative to work activity, by lowering the average marginal product of labor: with …rms'market power, in fact, steady state employment is ine¢ ciently low. Second, due to price rigidity, counter-cyclical movements in the markup (both current and future), lower the e¤ective marginal product of labor. In equilibrium, since hiring depends on the current and the expected future values of the marginal product of labor, this boosts hiring and employment.
In the baseline case we continue to assume ! = 0:9 and separable preferences ( = 1). We assume a steady state markup of 16 percent, a four-quarter degree of price stickiness, and monetary policy parameters = 1:5 and y = 0:5, in line with a standard Taylor rule. Recall that for a given value of ! the e¤ective hiring cost per unit of vacancy, parameterized by , reads
Hence in practice, given our strategy of targeting a value for ! , the introduction of market power per se, implying a < a, amounts to lowering the e¤ective hiring cost per employed worker. Adding price stickiness has the additional e¤ect of making the price markup time varying. Figure 10 illustrates the e¤ect of both market power and price stickiness on the size of the unemployment multiplier. We see that increasing the degree of market power can have a nonnegligible impact on both the unemployment and the output multiplier, but nowhere near the e¤ect due counter-cylical markups. Moving from perfect competition to a markup of 16 percent increases the output multiplier (at the peak) from about 0.2 to slightly above 0.3, whereas it increases the unemployment multiplier (in absolute value) from about 0.3 (at the peak) to 0.4.
The marginal e¤ect of price stickiness, however, is stronger: with four-quarter price stickiness the output multiplier at the peak rises to almost 0.6 whereas the unemployment multiplier rises further, to almost 0.8 (in absolute value). The key for the expansionary e¤ect on output derives from the strong fall in the markup, which raises the current and expected future marginal product of labor, therefore boosting the current hiring rate. The output multiplier, however, still remains largely below 1. The main reason is still the large negative wealth e¤ect on consumption (now included in the …gure), which falls substantially below baseline in all scenarios.
Complementarity, price stickiness and consumption So far a model including countercylical markups and a su¢ ciently high value for the marginal value of non-work activity may perform well in replicating the size of the estimated response of unemployment to an innovation in government spending. The model, however, does not seem equally successful in replicating the size of the estimated output multiplier. In other words, (un)employment seems even too responsive relative to GDP to an increase in government spending. The key behind a relatively modest response of output lies in the behavior of consumption, which invariably falls in the model whereas it rises in our estimates.
Before discussing our results, it is important to recall that the econometric …scal policy literature is divided on the e¤ects of government spending shocks on private consumption: the SVAR strand tends to …nd (as we do and as in Perotti (2007)) that consumption rises signi…cantly 29 , whereas the narrative-approach strand (as in Ramey (2009)) tends to …nd that consumption either marginally falls or that it remains virtually unchanged. Despite the di¤erences, however, nobody …nds that government spending crowds out private consumption as much as our model with search frictions implies, regardless of the presence of NK features. Hence it seems desirable to explore the role of modelling features that contribute at least to dampen the equilibrium response of consumption to government spending.
We have shown above that, under ‡exible prices, complementarity between consumption and employment worsens the ability of the model to generate sizeable multipliers (both for output and employment). In this section we show that with price stickiness the e¤ect of complementarity is reversed : if the degree of complementarity is su¢ ciently high, consumption can even rise and the output multiplier can be largely magni…ed. With = 3, in particular, the output multiplier at the peak is almost 2 whereas the unemployment multiplier is around 3 (in absolute value). The key for the higher value of the output multiplier is the positive e¤ect on consumption. For = 3, now consumption rises signi…cantly in response to the government spending shock.
The intuition for this result can be best understood in the limit case of prices being completely rigid, and the monetary policy rule being only responsive to in ‡ation. 30 In that case, the real interest rate must be constant. In turn, if the shock to government spending is mean reverting, this implies that the marginal utility of consumption must be constant through time:
U c (c t ; n t ) = U c (c t+1 ; n t+1 ) = U c
In equilibrium employment rises: this is a fortiori true in a model with price stickiness, for (as explained above) falling markups boost the marginal product of labor and in turn the hiring rate.
But for the marginal utility of consumption to remain constant in light of a rise in employment, consumption must necessarily rise. This complementarity e¤ect is then stronger the higher is . In our model with staggered prices and a more general monetary policy rule, the real interest rate is obviously not completely …xed. Yet, as we see from the picture, this intuition survives, as long as movements in the real interest rate are not too strong. In this respect, recall also that parameter does not only pin down the complementarity between consumption and hours, but also the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. 31 Hence, as rises, even in the case of relative large movements in the real interest rate, these would have smaller e¤ects on the current marginal utility of consumption. 
Conclusions

